INCLUSIONARY ZONING: UNFAIR RESPONSE TO THE NEED FOR LOW COST HOUSING by King, David S.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 4 4 (1981-1982)
Issue 4 Article 2
1-1-1982
INCLUSIONARY ZONING: UNFAIR
RESPONSE TO THE NEED FOR LOW COST
HOUSING
David S. King
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
David S. King, INCLUSIONARY ZONING: UNFAIR RESPONSE TO THE NEED FOR LOW COST HOUSING, 4 W. New Eng. L.
Rev. 597 (1982), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss4/2
INCLUSIONARY ZONING: UNFAIR 





DAVID S. KING* 
[Editor's note: This article was in the final stage ofpublication just 
as the Supreme Court o.fNew Jersey issued its final ruling in South­
ern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, Doc. No. 
A-35/36/172 (N.J. Jan. 21, 1983). It is the opinion of the author 
that in this ruling the court has undertaken to implement its original 
decision, and that inasmuch as it remains to be seen whether this can 
successfully be done, the comments and observations expressed in 
this article still stand] 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
. The housing problem for low and moderate income families has 
two dimensions. First is the matter of cost. The poor must pay a 
high percentage of their income to obtain even unsatisfactory accom­
modations: homes that are in disrepair and lack basic amenities. I 
Second is the matter of location. The housing that low and moderate 
income families can afford usually is in an unsafe, dirty neighbor­
hood poorly served by public and commercial facilities. Because of 
inadequate transportation, zoning restrictions, and an inability to 
obtain financing, a low and moderate income person's access to jobs, 
schools, and housing in suburbia is limited if not nonexistent.2 
The legal system has dealt with the problem in the courts and in 
the local legislatures. The purpose of this article is to review both 
the judicial and legislative approaches to resolution of the housing 
problem for low and moderate income families. The courts have 
invalidated zoning ordinances that have the effect of excluding low 
and moderate income persons from a community, while locallegisla­
tures have enacted inclusionary zoning ordinances requiring that the 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law; A.B., 
Dartmouth College, 1968; J.D., Cleveland State University, 1974; LL.M., Harvard Uni­
versity 1977. 
I. W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY 31 (1975). 
2. Id. 
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builder constructing more than a designated number of housing 
units to set aside a percentage of them for sale or rent to low and 
moderate income persons. 
II. THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION 
In the last decade, courts frequently have considered the prob­
lem of exclusionary zoning and its possible solutions.3 Typically, 
developers, alone or in combination with representatives of low in­
come groups wishing to find affordable housing in the suburbs, have 
challenged the validity of ordinances that impede the construction of 
low cost, multifamily dwellings.4 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in National Land and Invest­
ment Co. v. Easttown Township 5 determined that a zoning scheme 
with an exclusionary purpose or result was unacceptable as a viola­
tion of the state constitution.6 The same court, in In re Concord 
Township,7 held that prescribed minimum lot sizes of two acres on 
existing roads and three acres in the interior of a proposed 140 acre 
development were larger than necessary for the construction of a 
house.s Therefore, the minimum lot sizes were not proper subjects 
of public regulation and were "completely unreasonable."9 The 
court based its decision on National Land, which struck down a zon­
ing ordinance requiring a minimum lot size of four acres, the pri­
mary purpose of which was to avoid further economic burdens on 
the community in the provision of services and facilities by exclud­
ing newcomers.1O Such a requirement was not the proper subject of 
3. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cerl. 
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 
1974); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 
(1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. 
Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (Law Div. 1972), modified, 67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713, appeal 
dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 
N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182,382 A.2d 105 (1977); In 
re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). 
4. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 
A.2d 1192 (1977) in which the plaintiffs comprised two groups: corporate developers and 
low income persons representing a class who resided outside of the defendant township 
and who had sought housing there unsuccessfully. Id. at 492, 371 A.2d at 1196. 
5. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
6. Id. at 532-33, 215 A.2d at 613. 
7. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). 
8. Id. at 471,268 A.2d at 767. 
9. Id. 
10. 419 Pa. at 532-33, 215 A.2d at 612-13. 
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public regulation but, rather, was a matter of private preference~ II 
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not explicit in 
either National Land or In re Concord Township, the basis for finding 
the ordinances unconstitutional was that any exercise of zoning au­
thority which was not necessary to further the general welfare was 
not within the ambit of the police power. 12 In other words, the mini­
mum lot sizes in each case were unreasonable because they had an 
exclusionary purpose. As excluding those wishing to live in the com­
munity is not a proper government purpose, an ordinance imple­
menting such a purpose is unreasonable as an improper exercise of 
the police power. 
Neither case, however, mandated an affirmative remedy for ex­
clusionary zoning. Each afforded plaintiffs the usual judicial remedy 
of invalidating the existing ordinance. The most significant case pro­
viding an affirmative remedy is Southern Burlington County NAA CP 
v. Township ofMount Laurel,13 in which representatives of those ex­
cluded by the town's zoning scheme joined as plaintiffs. 14 Unlike the 
Pennsylvania court, the trial court specifically considered the prob­
lem of housing for low income families. The court directed the 
Mount Laurel authorities to determine the housing needs of three 
categories of low and moderate income persons: Those who resided 
in the township; those who were employed in the township; and 
those who were expected or projected to be employed in the town­
ship.IS Defendant was required to estimate the number of housing 
units that should be constructed each year to provide for the needs of 
those persons and then had to develop an affirmative program to 
fulfill those needs. 16 
The trial court invalidated the entire zoning ordinance because, 
by depriving the poor of adequate housing and of the opportunity to 
secure the construction of subsidized housing, it was economically 
discriminatory. As the ordinance failed to provide for the general 
welfare, it violated the state zoning act and the state constitution.'7 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that 
11. 439 Pa. at 470, 268 A.2d at 766 (quoting National Land and Iny. Co. y. East­
town Township, 419 Pa. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608 (1965». 
12. 439 Pa. 466 passim, 268 A.2d 765 passim (1970); 419 Pa. 504 passim, 215 A.2d 
597 passim (1965). 
13. 119 N.J. Super. 164,290 A.2d 465 (Law Diy. 1972), mod!fied, 67 N.J. 151,336 
A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
14. Id. at 166-67, 290 A.2d at 466-67. 
15. Id. at 178,290 A.2d at 473. 
16. Id. at 179,290 A.2d at 473-74. 
17. Id. 
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when a developing municipality, through its system of land use regu­
latioris, precluded the provision of a variety and choice of housing, it 
violated the state constitutional requirements of due process and 
equal protection and bore the burden of justifying its action or non­
action. IS The court, basing its decision on state law, reasoned that a 
zoning regulation, like any exercise of police power, must be in fur­
therance of the general welfare. 19 In the court's view, the zoning 
power was a police power of the state, and a local government was a 
delegate of the state in the exercise of that power. Consequently, the 
municipality was obligated to exercise the zoning power so as to pro­
mote the general welfare of all state citizens affected by its actions, 
including those living beyond its borders.20 The court imposed a 
duty on developing municipalities like Mount Laurel to consider the 
welfare of those who wished to live there and to provide, through 
land use regulations, a reasonable opportunity for the construction 
of all types of housing. The duty to provide the opportunity for low 
and moderate income housing extended to the municipality's fair 
share of the present and future regional needs.21 
Significantly, the court was unwilling to affirm the trial court's 
mandate that Mount Laurel conduct studies of low and moderate 
income housing needs and develop an affirmative plan to fulfill those 
needs. Expressing a more restrictive view of the judiciary's role, the 
court held that, in the first instance, it was the responsibility of the 
local legislature to determine the manner of compliance with the 
court's requirement that it provide its fair share of regional housing 
needs.22 Thus, the trial court's invalidation of the zoning ordinance 
was limited only to the extent that it failed to promote the general 
welfare in the manner mandated by the supreme court.23 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey was unsure what the trial 
judge's order required Mount Laurel to do. In any event, it con­
cluded that "courts do not build housing, nor do municipalities."24 
The municipality's function was merely to provide the opportunity 
for private builders and, in the case of public housing, the appropri­
ate agencies. Thus, the court allowed the municipality to remedy the 
defects in its zoning ordinance without judicial supervision, although 
18. 67 N.J. at 180-81, 336 A.2d at 728. 
19. Id. at 175,336 A.2d at 728. 
20. Id. at 174-78,336 A.2d at 725-27. 
21. Id. at 187-88, 336 A.2d at 731-32. 
22. Id. at 191, 336 A.2d at 734. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. 
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it strongly suggested that affirmative action, in addition to amending 
its zoning ordinances, would be appropriate.25 The court warned, 
however, that should Mount Laurel not perform as expected, plain­
tiffs were entitled to request further judicial action by supplemental 
pleading.26 
The court's concern with compliance was justified. In 1978, the 
trial court issued its opinion based on an amended complaint. In 
response to the supreme court, the township had rezoned twenty 
acres of its 22.4 square miles for higher density housing. Plaintiffs 
contended that this was woefully inadequate to fulfill Mount Lau­
rel's fair share of the regional need for low and moderate income 
housing as determined by the regional planning agency. 27 The trial 
judge, accepting the township's contention that the 10,000 units com­
pleted or under construction in planned unit developments would be 
available at reasonable rents and prices, ruled in its favor. 28 The 
court declined to accept plaintiffs' invitation to require defendants to 
take affirmative action through the use of subsidies in an effort to 
increase the amount of low and moderate income housing 
available.29 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has now consolidated Mount 
Laurel and other similar cases for review.30 The principal question 
left unanswered by Mount Laurel and its progeny31 remains un­
resolved: Having imposed a duty to provide a fair share of regional 
need for low and moderate income housing, how does a court en­
force the duty? The court's concern with the judicial role is evi­
denced in several of the twenty-four questions on exclusionary 
zoning that it propounded to the attorneys in the case: 
[17] Should a trial court retain jurisdiction to rule on orders of 
compliance after the main case has been appealed? 
[18] What function should a showing of good faith or bona fide 
efforts at compliance with existing principles of law play in these 
cases? 
25. Id. The court opined that there was at least a moral obligation to establish a 
municipal housing agency to provide for the housing needs of the town's resident poor. 
26. Id. 
27. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 161 
N.J. Super. 317, 321, 331-37, 391 A.2d 935, 937, 943-46 (Law Div. 1978). 
28. Id. at 354,391 A.2d at 954. 
29. Id. 
30. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1980, at B2, col. I. 
31. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 
679 (1979) (modifying as to delete the trial court's order that the town provide for the 
construction of at least 3,500 units of multi-family housing by the end of 1987). 
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[19] Discuss the validity of a "trickling down" theory in the cur­
rent housing market. 
[20] Discuss the function of "phasing" in a fair share plan. 
[21] Discuss the legal and practical implications of the following 
remedial devices a court might employ in exclusionary zoning 
cases: 
-Total invalidation of an ordinance, accompanied by an or­
der to draft a new ordinance within a certain time period [i.e., 
90 days] or be unzoned .... 
-Presumptive variances as suggested by Justice Pash­
man in Pascack and Fobe. 
-An order for specific rezoning of plaintiffs' land for 
multi-family development [Builder's remedy]. 
--Orders to seek subsidies, provide density bonuses, in­
stitute rent-skewing. 
-Specific rezoning for high-density development ac­
companied by automatic reverter if the development planned 
is not for low and moderate income units. 
[22] Should all remedies developed in these cases be tracked to 
the level of need in the region and/or municipality, or does Oak­
wood suggest the possibility of "numberless" [as opposed to fair 
share/regional need] remedies? 
[23] Discuss the function of expert planners in exclusionary zon­
ing litigation: 
-At what stage of such litigation should expert planners 
be utilized? 
-Should a trial judge delegate rezoning authority to 
such expert, and embody the product of such rezoning in the 
trial court judgment? 
-How should such expert be selected and paid? 
[24] Should the trial judge assume a supervisory role over the 
implementation of his order? If so, how long should such role 
continue?32 
The essential difficulty in answering these questions is revealed when 
one learns that the case was argued before the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey in December, 1980, and as of this writing, the court has 
just ruled.33 
Nor have other jurisdictions prohibiting exclusionary zoning 
practices been successful in defining the extent of the role of the judi­
32. D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DE­
VELOPMENT 94-95 (Supp. 1981). 
33. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1980, IV, at 6, col. 3; Id., Jan. 21, 1983 at AI, col. 1. 
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ciary in cases similar to Mount Laurel. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, following its earlier course,34 adopted the Mount Laurel prin­
ciple that each municipality must provide a fair-share of land for the 
needs of all people wishing to live within its boundaries.35 Although 
the court held that the zoning ordinance permitting multifamily uses 
in only 1.14 percent of the town's acreage was exclusionary, the rem­
edy it ordered was modest: a mandate that a building permit issue to 
plaintiff-developer.36 Nevertheless, in his concurring opinion, Jus­
tice Roberts warned of the dangers inherent in adoption of the fair 
share doctrine: to do so would transform courts into "super boards 
of adjustment" and "planning commissions of last resort,"37 a func­
tion for which courts are ill equipped and which properly belongs to 
legislative and administrative bodies.38 
The New York courts have fared no better. In Berenson v. Town 
ofNew Castle ,39 the court of appeals held that a zoning ordinance 
could not exclude multi-family dwellings if it failed to provide for a 
balanced and integrated community and to consider regional needs 
and requirements. In light of this ruling, the trial court later found 
that the town had ignored the needs of both its own residents and 
those of the region and, therefore, was not in compliance with the 
standards established by the court of appeals.40 Believing it neces­
sary to award plaintiffs affirmative relief, the trial court determined 
that 3,500 units of multifamily housing were needed over the next 
ten years and gave the town six months to amend its zoning ordi­
nances and planning policies to facilitate construction of the needed 
housing.41 
The appellate division held that the trial court had gone too 
far.42 It considered the multifamily housing quota of 3,500 units to 
be abstract, speculative, and only tenuously related to the evidence 
34. See text accompanying notes 5-10 supra; see a/so, Township of Willistown v. 
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975), in which a plurality of the 
court adopted the fair share doctrine. 
35. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182,382 A.2d 105 (1977). 
36. Id. at 196, 382 A.2d at 112. 
37. Id. at 200, 382 A.2d at 115 (Roberts, J., concurring) (quoting Township ofWil­
Iistown v. ChesterdaIe Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 452-53, 341 A.2d 466, 470 (1975) (Pome­
roy, J., dissenting». 
38. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. at 200, 382 A.2d at 115 (Roberts, J., 
concurring). 
39. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975). 
40. 67 A.D.2d 506, 512, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 673 (1979). 
41. Id. at 512-13, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 673. 
42. Id. at 520-22, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678-79. 
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presented.43 It found that the trial court's order did not require that 
the quota be attained by the construction of low and moderate in­
come units,44 an incongruous result considering that the fair share 
doctrine required a municipality to provide its fair share of housing 
for low and moderate income families. Concluding that it had no 
authority to remedy by judicial fiat a town's failure to provide for 
unmet local or regional needs, the court eliminated the 3,500 unit 
requirement and gave the town six months to remedy its zoning 
deficiencies.45 
State courts are not alone in their reluctance to mandate the 
construction of a minimum number of housing -units as a component 
of a remedy for exclusionary zoning. Federal courts, in fashioning a 
remedy for a municipality's violation of title VIII of the Fair Hous­
ing Act of 1968 (The Act),46 similarly have been averse to doing so, 
even when it has been found that the defendant city deliberately ex­
cluded low income housing in order to maintain a racially segre­
gated community. In United States v. City of Parma ,47 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district 
court's finding that defendant had violated the Act in several ways, 
including the city's long-standing opposition to any form of low in­
come housing.48 As part of its remedial decree, however, the district 
court, inter alia, required the city to "make all efforts necessary to 
ensure that at least 133 units of low and moderate income housing 
are provided annually in Parma"49 and appointed a special master to 
supervise the process. 50 
The court of appeals found the order to ensure the provision of 
133 units of low and moderate income housing units annually to be 
premature. As had the district court, it recognized that the ultimate 
burden of providing low income housing belonged to developers 
rather than to the city. Therefore, the court vacated the provision for 
a minimum number of units, preferring to establish a vague goal of 
meeting whatever need existed within a reasonable time.51 Thus, 
even when it is clear that racial prejudice has motivated a municipal­
43. Id. at 519-20, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 677-78. 
44. /d. at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678. 
45. Id. at 522-23, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976). 
47. 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1972 (1982). 
48. 661 F.2d at 574-75. 
49. United States v. City of Parma, 504 F. Supp. 913, 923 (N.D. Ohio 1980), a./f'd in 
parI, rev'd in parI, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1972 (1982). 
50. Id. at 925-26. 
51. 661 F.2d at 578. 
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ity to exclude low income housing, the courts are reluctant to require 
the construction of a specific number of housing units. 
Similarly, commentators have expressed considerable doubt as 
to the capability of courts to enforce the Mount Laurel provision re­
quiring that a municipality provide its fair share of the regional need 
for low income housing.52 At a minimum, it would be necessary for 
a court to retain jurisdiction to ensure that the municipality had re­
vised its zoning ordinances and had taken the necessary steps to de­
termine the regional need for low and moderate income housing, to 
determine the municipality's fair share of that need, and to see that 
the municipality provides that share. It may necessitate the court's 
appointment of expert consultants on urban planning to advise the 
court on the adequacy and efficiency of the municipality's actions. 53 
This process may involve extensive judicial supervision over a 
number of years, as has occurred in school desegregation cases,54 in 
order to enforce a decree against a reluctant municipality. 
Thus, courts which have found exclusionary zoning to be inva­
lid have imposed a duty on municipalities to provide their fair share 
of such need and have thereby created a right on the part of those 
excluded to have that need fulfilled. However, the judicial reluc­
tance to define further a municipality'S duty in terms of specific 
numbers of housing units, together with protracted litigation and the 
inherent difficulty of supervision, have made enforcement of that 
right problematical. Thus, a legislative solution to the problem ap­
pears to be more appropriate. 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
Proponents of a legislative solution to the problem of inade­
quate housing for low and moderate income families offer both eco­
nomic and sociological arguments to support their position. They 
content, ultimately, that society will be economically more efficient 
and socially cohesive if zoning legislation is employed to promote, or 
at least not to hinder, reasonable housing opportunities for all. 
52. See, e.g., Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved 
Issues, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 689 (1975); Note, The Inadequacy ofJudicial Remedies in Cases 
oj Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REV. 760 (1976); see also D. HOROWITZ, THE 
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY passim (1977). 
53. See, e.g., Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor of Washington, 131 N.J. Super. 195,329 
A.2d 89 (Law Div. 1974), modified, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977). 
54. See, e.g., the six year desegregation attempt in Wright v. City Council of Em­
poria,407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
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The United States Housing Act of 193755 declared the national 
policy of providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for low in­
come families. The Housing Act of 194956 broadened the goal to 
include "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every 
American family."57 Local zoning controls have hampered the at­
tainment of these goals in several ways. It has been postulated that 
land use controls frequently have the effect of excluding from subur­
ban communities anyone whose income is lower than that of the cur­
rent residents by maintaining housing rents at an artificially high 
level.58 Large lot, low density zoning contributes to a higher price 
per 10t.59 Minimum floor area requirements result in the construc­
tion of homes that are larger and more expensive than necessary to 
maintain minimum health standards.60 Requirements that a subdi­
vision developer provide basic improvements such as streets, side­
walks, and sewers,61 and even dedicate land for schools and parks or 
pay a fee in lieu of doing SO,62 increase the cost of housing and place 
the burden of financing community amenities on new residents. 
Building code standards in many communities exceed those of the 
Federal Housing Administration and add significantly to the cost of 
a new home.63 Administrative delays, including court proceedings, 
further increase the cost to the developer, who must continue to bear 
the financing charges on the undeveloped land while also paying le­
gal fees.64 
Thus, the reasoning goes, elimination or reform of restrictive 
zoning laws will inure to the community's benefit. Increased density 
will increase consumer demand, thereby generating new employ­
ment opportunities. Most costs to the communities, resulting from 
55. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified at 42 U.S.c. §§ 1401-1435 
(1976». 
56. Act of July 15, 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 
42 U.S.c.). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). 
58. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 3-6 (1973). 
59. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 
214 (1968). 
60. Id. at 215. 
61. See, e.g., Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal.App.2d 919, 228 P.2d 847 (Ct. 
App. 1951); Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233,137 N.E.2d 371 (1956). 
62. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Cimmaron Corp. 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 193 Colo. 164, 563 P.2d 946 (1977); Call v. City of West 
Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 
608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). 
63. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 41, at 257-307. 
64. In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). 
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higher density requirements in terms of fire, police, welfare, and 
school costs, would be outweighed by the increased revenues that 
they generated.6s 
Claimed social advantages include the creation of a culturally 
diversified community; one where residents include young and old, 
poor and wealthy, black and white, and one in which the current 
residents will have the opportunity to live with persons from a wide 
variety of socioeconomic backgrounds.66 Commentators have ar­
gued that economic integration will enhance efficiency by reducing 
social pathologies attendant upon separation of socioeconomic 
groups.67 
However, there are arguments to the contrary. A panel of ex­
perts assembled by the National Academy of Sciences at the request 
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) con­
cluded that the desirability of promoting socioeconomic integration 
in housing was questionable because of untested assumptions about 
interaction across socioeconomic lines.68 The panei further con­
cluded that there was no evidence to support the feasibility of such 
integration given the trend in movements of the urban population 
toward increased socioeconomic segregation.69 One survey reported 
that low income families prefer to live in neighborhoods populated 
primarily by other low income families.70 
The ultimate justification, however, may be a moral one, in the 
sense that human suffering has been eased by helping to provide new 
housing in the suburbs for the urban poor.7! 
A. InC/usionary Ordinances 
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act,72 the model statute 
upon which are based most state enactments authorizing local gov­
65. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note: 41, at 53. 
66. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PuBLIC SCHOOLS 
108-13,221-41 (1967). 
67. See, e.g., C. HAAR & D. IATRIDlS, HOUSING THE POOR IN SUBURBIA 14-17 
(1974); L. RUBINOWiTZ, Low-INCOME HOUSING: SUBURBAN STRATEGIES 9-25 (1974); 
REpORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 263 (Mar. I, 1968). 
68. Hawley & Rock, Introduction, in SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS 20 (A. 
Hawley & V. Rock eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hawley & Rock, Introduction); see 
also W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, supra note I, at 113-27. 
69. Hawley & Rock, Introduction, supra note 68. 
70. W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, supra note I, at 103. 
71. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 58, at 48. 
72. UNiTED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A 
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926). 
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ernments to propound zoning regulations, expresses the traditional 
purposes of such regulations: 
To lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, 
panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general wel­
fare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowd­
ing of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to 
facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewer­
age, schools, parks and other public requirements.?3 
In its legislative efforts to accomplish these purposes, a municipality 
is constrained by the limits of the police power: that inherent power 
of government to act in furtherance of the public health, safety, 
morals, and general welfare.74 Division of a city into separate use 
districts and regulation of the uses within each district are the tradi­
tional methods for accomplishing the goals.75 This practice reflects 
the similarity of zoning legislation to nuisance law, which separates 
uses that are incompatible with one another and excludes uses which 
are unacceptable in the community. Courts, however, were quick to 
accept the rationale that a zoning ordinance was valid so long as it 
promoted the general welfare, regardless of whether it restricted or 
excluded a particular use.76 Courts have approved limitations on 
use, such as: Minimum lot sizes;77 minimum setbacks;78 front and 
side yards;79 height and bulk restrictions;80 and minimum floor 
areas.81 The result has been to add significant costs to the price 
of housing82 and to preclude many low and moderate income fami­
lies from purchasing or renting a home in many suburban 
communities.83 
73. Id. § 3. 
74. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
75. See, e.g., id. at 380-82. 
76. See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). 
77. Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Simon v. 
Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City 
of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025,246 S.W.2d 771, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952). 
78. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). 
79. Garrity v. District of Columbia, 86 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1936). 
80. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Highland Park, 9 Ill. 2d 364, 137 
N.E.2d 835 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 922 (1957). 
81. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165,89 A.2d 693 (1952), 
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). 
82. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 58, at 3-7. 
83. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Simons, Home Rule and 
ExclUSionary Zoning: An Impediment to Low and Moderate Income Housing, 33 OHIO 
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One legislative response of local governments to the problem of 
inadequate housing for low and moderate income families has been 
the inclusionary zoning ordinance. The purposes of such an ordi­
nance is typically twofold: To provide a necessary stimulus to the 
production of low cost housing in suburbs where the median cost of 
a dwelling is beyond the means of those with limited incomes,84 and 
to assure that sufficient land within the community is allocated to the 
needs of all socioeconomic and racial groups.85 There are basically 
two types of inclusionary ordinances: The mandatory ordinance, 
which requires the developer to include a certain percentage of low 
and moderate income units in his project;86 and the voluntary ordi­
nance, which encourages a developer to include such units by al­
lowing him to increase the number of market priced units he may 
build on the site.87 
B. Mandatory Inc/usionary Ordinances 
The typical mandatory inclusionary ordinance requires a devel­
oper of more than a specified minimum number of units to reserve a 
certain percentage of them for sale or rent to lower income fami­
lies.88 For example, the Los Angeles, California ordinance requires a 
developer of a multifamily project consisting of five or more units to 
make a reasonable effort to set aside at least fifteen percent of them 
for persons of low or moderate income with six percent of the fifteen 
percent total specifically designated for persons of low income.89 
Developers must give the city housing authority a right of first re-
ST. L.l. 621 (1972). The foregoing would seem to support the prediction of one trial 
court judge that: 
[t)he plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question [a compre­
hensive zoning ordinance) is to place all the property in an undeveloped area of 
16 square miles in a strait-jacket. ... In the last analysis, the result to be ac­
complished is to classify the population and segregate them according to their 
income or situation in life. 
Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 
365 (1926). . 
84. See, e.g., Kleven, InC/usionary Ordinance~Policy and Legal Issues in Requir­
ing Private Developers to Build Low Cost HOUSing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432, 1452-53 
(1974). 
85. See, e.g., Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate 
Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1023 (1976).' 
86. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE, ch. 25A (1974); Los ANGELES, CAL., 
MUNICIPAL CODE, §§ 12.03, 12.39, 13.04 (1974). 
87. HIGHLAND PARK, ILL., ZONING ORDINANCE § 150.130.9.2 (1978); NEWTON, 
MAss., REv. ORDINANCES, ch. 24, § 29(b) (1977). 
88. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.39 (1974). 
89. Id. § 12.39.A.1. 
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fusa1 to rent or buy the set-aside units,90 but may rent or sell the 
required units at fair market va1ue.91 The rental units are subsidized 
by the federa.l section 8 program for lower-income housing assist­
ance.92 Units to be offered for sale may be subsidized by the federal 
section 235 program.93 The developer is not required to market the 
units at a loss if it is financially impossible to develop subsidized 
units.94 The developer, however, must make every reasonable effort 
to produce the set-aside units at prices that allow persons of low and 
moderate income to rent or buy them.95 Therefore, it would seem 
that developers of luxurious projects would have to include some 
modestly priced dwellings in order to comply with the enactment. 
Because the Los Angeles ordinance does not require that a 
builder sell or rent any units below market value, the ordinance 
should be able to withstand· a claim by a developer that his property 
is being taken without compensation in violation of the fifth amend­
ment.96 If, however, the developer must sell or rent the set-aside 
units below the market rate, additional provisions are required to 
guard against such a claim. 
For example, the Montgomery County, Maryland, moderately 
priced dwelling unit (MPDU) ordinance97 requires that 12.5 percent 
of the units in new housing projects of fifty units or more be reserved 
for sale or lease to moderate income families at prices to be fixed by 
the county executive.98 Eligible households may have an income no 
greater than 200 percent of the section 8 income limits for very low 
income households in Montgomery County.99 The ordinance so 
provides 
To insure that private developers constructing moderately priced 
dwelling units pursuant to the requirements of this chapter incur 
no loss or penalty as a result thereof, but rather, that they can, by 
virtue of the optional density bonus provision of this chapter. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92.. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437(1) (West Supp. 1982). "Section 8" is a subsidized housing 
program by which the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) makes 
up the difference between what a low income household can afford to pay and the fair 
market rent established by HUD for an adequate housing unit. No eligible tenant need 
pay more than 25% of adjusted income toward rent. Id. 
93. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z (West 1980 & Supp. 1982). 
94. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § l2.39.A.l (1974). 
95. Id. 
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
97. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE, ch. 25A (1974). 
98. Id. ch. 25A-4(a)(1) (1974 & amend. 1981). 
99. Id. ch. 2SA-6(a) (1974). 
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realize a reasonable profit from their endeavors in this regard. 100 
If the applicant elects the optional density provision, construction of 
an increased number of moderately priced dwelling units is permit­
ted. 101 For example, a developer proposing to build 100 units would 
be required to set aside 12.5 percent of them for sale or lease at mod­
erate prices as fixed by the county executive. Assuming that the 
maximum allowable density for the site is 100 units, under the den­
sity bonus provision of the ordinance, he would then be entitled to 
construct a total of 120 units, fifteen (12.5 percent) of which would 
have to be moderately priced units. The remaining units could be 
market-priced units. Thus, in return for building fifteen moderately 
priced units, the developer obtains a bonus authorizing five addi­
tional market-priced units. 
To prevent speculation by persons who might purchase an 
MPDU and then resell it at the market price, the ordinance prohibits 
the sale of such a unit for a period of ten years from the date of the 
original sale for a price greater than the original sales price plus al­
lowances for cost of living increases, improvements made to the unit, 
and closing costS.102 Further, the unit must first be offered for sixty 
days exclusively to persons determined by the department of com­
munity development to be of eligible income. 103 
C. Voluntary InC/usionary Ordinances 
The typical voluntary inclusionary ordinance allows a devel­
oper to apply for increased density on the site in return for providing 
a certain percentage of subsidized or below-market-priced units. For 
instance, the housing income mix program in Newton, Massachu­
setts, requires a developer who requests an increase in density to set 
aside approximately ten percent of the planned units for low and 
moderate income housing. I04 
IV. LEGALITY OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING ORDINANCES 
The principal legal challenge to an inclusionary zoning ordi­
nancels is that such an enactment exceeds the limits of a legitimate 
100. Id. ch. 2sA-2(6) (1974). 
101. Id. ch. 2sA-s(a) (1974). 
102. Id. ch. 2sA-7(a) & (b) (1974 & amend. 1981). 
103. Id. 
104. NEWTON, MASS., REv. ORDINANCES ch. 24, § 29(b)(1) (1977). 
105. The ordinance may also be challenged on the basis that its promulgation by 
the municipality exceeds the authority delegated to the municipality by the state's consti­
tution or enabling act. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. DeGrojf Enterprises, 214 Va. 
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exercise of the state's police power and effects a taking of the devel­
oper's property without just compensation in violation of the fifth 
amendment. 106 The traditional test used by the courts to determine 
whether a taking has occurred is that formulated by Justice Holmes: 
"The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to 
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking." 107 The determination of what constitutes a taking is "a 
question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general 
propositions."108 Nevertheless, courts have usually examined one or 
more of four factors in determining whether government action con­
stitutes a taking: (1) Whether the government or its agents physi­
cally invaded or appropriated the claimant's property; (2) the 
diminution in value of the plaintiff's property resulting from the gov­
ernment's act; (3) a balancing of the public benefit obtained from the 
act against the private loss suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) the dis­
tinction between the creation of a public benefit and the prevention 
of harm. 109 
A. Physical Invasion 
When the government actually seizes or occupies property be­
longing to a claimant, it is almost certain that courts will require 
compensation to be paid. llo This is true even when the invasion is 
insubstantial. III Although this test has been criticized because it ele­
vates form over substance and fails to explain why compensation 
should be required for physical invasions that inflict only minimal 
economic harms,112 courts nevertheless have employed it. There­
235,238, 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1973). This inquiry will be directed only toward the ordi­
nance's validity under the federal constitution. 
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 239, 241 (1897). 
107. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
108. Id. at 416. 
109. Michelman, Property, Utility. and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda­
tions of ''lust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184-1201 (1967); see also 
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 46-60 (1964). 
110. E.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). But see Na­
tional Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 93 (1969) (as physical occupation of 
the plaintiffs building was for the plaintiffs, rather than the public's benefit, no compen­
~ation was required). See also 2 P. NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.2 (J. 
Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1981). 
111. E.g., Lovett v. West Virginia Cent. Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E. 196 
(1909). 
112. Sax, supra note 109, at 46-48. 
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fore, it may prove useful to hypothesize how it might be applied to 
determine the validity of an inclusionary zoning ordinance. 
An inclusionary zoning ordinance requires the developer to set 
aside a certain number of housing units for occupancy by persons 
who are not necessarily of the developer's choosing.II3 One might 
argue that the government has physically invaded those units: It has 
abrogated the developer's possessory interest in them by decreeing 
that they shall be occupied only by persons of low or moderate in­
come. Therefore, one might conclude that a taking requiring just 
compensation has occurred. 
The government, however, has not denied the developer all eco­
nomic benefit from the set-aside units. He may structure the project 
so as to be eligible for federal subsidies, or the ordinance may allow 
him to sell or rent the property at a certain level, albeit below mar­
ket. II4 Because the developer has not been deprived of all reason­
able use of his property, a court may prefer to apply the diminution 
of value test. I IS 
B. Diminution of Value 
When the effect of a zoning ordinance is to reduce severely the 
value of the property in question, the courts will frequently find that 
a taking has occurred. II6 The test is often stated as follows: "An 
ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it 
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond 
regulation, and must be recognized as a taking ofthe property."ll7 It 
is not a bright line test, and courts have sustained ordinances causing 
large reductions in value. I IS 
The problem lies in defining the property the use of which is 
claimed to be unreasonably restricted. I 19 The developer who is sub­
113. Eg., Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 12.39 (1974). 
114. Id. 
115. But see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 150 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
116. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Dooley 
v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); Arveme Bay Con· 
str. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). 
117. Arveme Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 
(1938) (original emphasis). 
118. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) 
(75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% diminu­
tion in value). 
119. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419-20 (1922) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Michelman, supra note 109, at 1192-93; Sax, supra note 109, at 
36,60. 
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ject to a mandatory inclusionary ordinance may claim that because 
his right to use the set-aside units has been abrogated, a taking has 
occurred. That he receives some remuneration in the form of below­
market rent or purchase price should not be determinative of 
whether there has been a taking but, rather, only of how much com­
pensation he is entitled to ifthere has been a taking. 120 Nevertheless, 
it is likely that in evaluating an inclusionary ordinance lower courts 
will follow the lead ofthe United States Supreme Court in Penn Cen­
tral Transportation Co. v. New York City.121 In Penn Central, the 
Court held that prohibiting plaintiff from constructing a fifty-five 
story tower over Grand Central Station did not constitute a taking of 
the air rights to the parce1. 122 The Court reasoned that the air rights 
were transferable and, therefore, still valuable. 123 Moreover, the re­
strictions allowed plaintiff not only to use the site in a gainful man­
ner, but also to enhance the value of its other properties. 124 
Similarly, a court could uphold a mandatory inclusionary zon­
ing ordinance on the theory that even if a developer suffers a loss on 
the units required to be set aside, the development considered as a 
whole, including the market-priced units, still is profitable. The 
, court could, therefore, hold that there has been no taking. 
A close analogy can be found in ordinances requiring a devel­
oper, as a precondition for approval of a subdivision, to dedicate and 
improve land for streets, parks, schools, and other facilities necessi­
tated by his project. These mandatory dedications are called subdi­
vision exactions. Courts have upheld exactions requiring the 
developer to build streets and storm sewers,125 as well as to pay fees 
in lieu of dedications. 126 Several courts that have found exactions to 
be unlawful have done so on the basis that they were not authorized 
by the state enabling statute. 127 When the ordinance is not ultra 
120. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 150-51 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
121. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 137. 
124. Id. at 138 & n.36. 
125. See Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956); see 
also Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d I (1949). 
126. Associated Homebuilders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 
606,94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Jordan v. Village of Me­
nomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.s. 4 
(1966). 
127. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960); 
Coronado Development Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174,368 P.2d 51 (1962); 
Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961). 
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vires, courts have usually framed the test of validity as follows: "[I]f 
the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely at­
tributable to his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, 
it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private property in 
contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reason­
able regulations under the police power."J28 Courts requiring a close 
nexus between the activity the subdivision will generate and the re­
quired exaction or fee are more prone to striking down subdivision 
exactions}29 On the other hand, courts considering the cumulative 
effect of a number of subdivisions on the community are more will­
ing to uphold the exactions.l3° 
Some commentators believe that analogizing the inclusionary 
zoning ordinances to subdivision exactions is appropriate on the the­
ory that new residential developments create a need for low cost 
housing for the lower-income persons drawn into the community by 
the employment prospects resulting from increased economic activ­
ity. J3J Others, however, believe the analogy to be disingenuous. 132 It 
seems strained, at best, to contend that a subdivision of market­
priced homes or apartments creates a need for low-cost housing in 
the same way that it creates a need for roads, schools, and parks. 
New residents may increase the burden on existing facilities and 
thereby justify a municipality's requirement that the developer com­
pensate by dedicating land to augment the existing facilities or by 
paying a fee to improve or maintain them. It can hardly be said, 
however, that the increased construction of new residences increases 
o 
the burden on existing low-income housing, thereby justifying a mu­
nicipality's demand that the developer provide more. 
The principal case to consider the validity ofa mandatory inclu­
sionary zoning ordinance is Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enter­
prises, Inc.. 133 Fairfax County had passed an amendment to its 
zoning ordinance requiring a developer of fifty or more dwelling 
128. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137 N.W.2d 442, 
447 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (quoting Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. 
Village of Mount Prospect, 22 lli. 2d 375, 380, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961). 
129. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 lli. 2d 375, 176 
N.E.2d 799 (1961); see Berg Dev. Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1980); see also City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d 363 (Ala. 
1978); Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 82 N.M. 322, 481 P.2d 401 (1971). 
130. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). 
131. See Kleven, supra note 84, at 1495. 
132. See Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 
1212 (1981). 
133. 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973). 
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units to set aside, prior to rezoning or site plan approval, at least 
fifteen percent of the units for low and moderate income housing. 
The units could be sold or rented only to low and moderate income 
persons as defined by the Fairfax County Housing and Redevelop­
ment Authority and HUD. Those agencies fixed the maximum 
prices at which the units could be sold or rented. 134 The court held 
that these requirements violated the provisions of the Virginia Con­
stitution that property not be taken or damaged for public purposes 
without just compensation. 135 The case, however, provides little gui­
dance for other courts confronted with the problem. 136 
C. Balancing Test 
In view of the difficulty of determining the point at which a 
diminution in value resulting from a legislative act changes from an 
uncompensable exercise of police power into a compensable taking, 
an application of another traditional test may be appropriate. 
Courts may wish to balance the social gains the measure produces 
against the private losses it inflicts. 137 If the benefit to society out­
weighs the injury to the individual, then no taking is deemed to have 
occurred. 
Applying the test to an inclusionary zoning ordinance, one 
could conclude that the loss of expected profit the developer suffers 
is justified by the gain to society of increased housing opportunities 
for low and moderate income persons. As noted previously,138 the 
balancing test may be used appropriately to determine whether a 
measure ought to be enacted, but not to determine whether the one 
whom it disadvantages ought to be compensated. If the measure 
does produce gains for many, particularly low and moderate income 
home seekers, far outweighing the individual developer's losses, it 
134. /d. at 235-36, 198 S.E.2d at 601. 
135. Id. at 238, 198 S.E.2d at 602. 
136. The DeGrojJ court based its decision on Virginia precedent, reciting three 
cases and their respective holdings without attempting to analogize those cases to the case 
at bar. Id. at 238, 198 S.E.2d at 602 (1973). After viewing the holdings of those cases, the 
court concluded that "[w]hen the amendment is measured by these legal standards, we 
find it deficient." Id. The Virginia court noted that the amendment was unconstitutional 
"because it [was] socio-economic zoning and attempt[ed] to control the compensation for 
the use of land and the improvements thereon." Id. This explanation constituted the 
extent of the court's analysis. 
137. See Michelman, supra note 87, at 1193; see also Department of Ecology v. 
Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash.2d 203, 207-12, 571 P.2d 196, 198-201 (1977) (court ac­
knowledged criticism of the balancing test but applied it nonetheless). 
138. Michelman, supra note 109, at 1193-96. 
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seems reasonable that the latter be compensated out of that excess of 
gains. 
D. Prevention ofHarm or Creation ofBenefit 
Another test traditionally employed to decide whether economic 
harm brought about by the government is compensable asks whether 
the regulation prohibits conduct that is harmful to others or whether 
the regulation exacts a public benefit at the expense of the private 
property owner. "The idea is that compensation is required when 
the public helps itself to good at private expense, but not when the 
public simply requires one of its members to stop making a nuisance 
of himself."139 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that prohibit­
ing the use of property for purposes the legislature found to be inju­
rious to the community's health, safety, or morals is not a taking for 
the benefit of the public and therefore is not compensable. 14O The 
difficulty with this test is that its outcome depends on the definition 
of preventing a harm and appropriating a benefit. For instance, be­
cause the use of property for prostitution generally is considered to 
be noxious, prohibiting such use is not compensable. 141 In contrast, 
a prohibition against the commercial development of wetlands, for 
example, is considered an act appropriating to the public the benefit 
of leaving the property in its natural state. 142 Therefore, the land­
owner ought to be entitled to compensation. At least one court, how­
ever, has found that prohibiting the filling of wetlands does not 
constitute a taking on the ground that such a prohibition merely con­
stitutes "a restriction on the use of a citizen's property, not to secure 
a benefit for the public, but to prevent a harm from the change in the 
natural character of the citizen's property."143 
On the other hand, in Devines v. Maier,l44 in which tenants con­
tested the actions of the city of Milwaukee in evicting them from 
substandard housing pursuant to its housing code, the Seventh Cir­
139. Id. at 1196 (footnote omitted); see also E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: 
PuBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 546 (1904); Dunham, A Legal and Eco­
nomic Basisfor City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 663-69 (1958). 
140. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). 
141. See L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900); see also Pierce Oil 
Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919) (gasoline storage facilities); Fertilizing Co. v. 
Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (fertilizer operations). 
142. See Dooley v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 
(1964). 
143. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 16,201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (1972). 
144. 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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cuit rejected the city's contention that "the enforcement of building 
codes is the legitimate exercise of a police power to forbid uses of 
private property which effect public nuisances that cause a detriment 
to public health and safety."145 The court of appeals also rejected 
the conclusion of the district court that "[h]ousing code enforcement 
is. . . not designed to appropriate property for public use at private 
expense, ... but rather ... [is] designed to prevent the injury and 
disease which are so often the by-products of substandard hous­
ing."I46 The court of appeals instead found that the city had evicted 
the tenants in order to promote the public's interest in health, safety, 
and general welfare. 147 Because the city destroyed the tenants' lease­
hold rights, the court held that a taking under the fifth amendment 
had occurred. 148 
In effect, the Devines court stood the prevention of "harm-crea­
tion of benefit test" on its head and applied the diminution of value 
test. Under this analysis, any government regulation seeking to pre­
vent a property owner from "making a nuisance of himself' also can 
be seen as securing a public benefit requiring compensation. As Jus­
tice Brennan stated, it is axiomatic that the public benefit from any 
police power regulation; otherwise it is unlawful. 149 Such a regula­
tion can be defined either as preventing harm or creating a benefit, as 
the court chooses, because prevention of the harm is the means 
adopted to secure the benefit. Similarly, an inclusionary zoning or­
dinance might be viewed as securing a public benefit or as prevent­
ing a harm. Requiring a developer to set aside a certain number of 
units for low and moderate income housing secures for the public the 
benefit of increasing the supply of affordable housing. In the alter­
na~ive, the ordinance prevents the harm of forcing people to live in 
substandard housing because of an inadequate supply of decent 
. housing. The test is no test at all; it allows a court to rationalize 
either a conclusion that a government regulation requires compensa­
tion to the affected property owner or that it "does not. 
v. FAIRNESS OF INCLUSIONARY ORDINANCES 
In the last few years, the Supreme Court has decided three cases 
that raise the issue of the degree to which a government regulation 
145. Id. at 145. 
146. Id. at 142. 
147. Id. at 146. 
148. Id. 
149. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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becomes a taking requiring just compensation. In Penn Central, a 
local landmark law prohibited plaintiff from building a high-rise of­
fice tower over Grand Central Terminal. I50 In Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, lSI the municipality down-zoned plaintifi's five-acre resi­
dential site, thereby reducing the allowable density.152 In San Diego 
Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, JS3 the city designated 
plaintifi's property as open space, an action which plaintiff con­
tended deprived it of all beneficial use of the site. 154 
In all three cases, the Court considered the regulation's eco­
nomic impact on the property owner to be a relevant factor,155 but 
"reject[ed] the proposition that diminution in property value, stand­
ing alone, can establish a 'taking' ...."156 Thus, that a developer 
earns a lower return on his investment because an inclusionary zon­
ing ordinance requires him to rent or sell some units at below-mar­
ket rates will not, alone, support a claim that the ordinance effects a 
taking. 
Both Penn Central and San Diego focused on another relevant 
consideration: that the just compensation clause is " 'designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole... .' "157 Justice Brennan, however, conceded that the 
"Court . . . has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for deter­
mining when 1ustice and fairness' require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather 
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."158 
One suggested test for determining fairness provides: 
A decision not to compensate is not unfair as long as the disap­
150. 438 U.S. at 116-17. 
151. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
152. Id. at 257. 
153. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
154. Id. at 626. 
155. ''The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and particularly, the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta­
tions are, of course, relevant considerations." 438 U.S. at 124. ''The application of a 
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance. . . denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land ...." 447 U.S. at 260. "It is only logical, 
then, that government action . . . can be a 'taking' . . . where the effects completely 
deprive the owner of aU or most of his interest in the property." 450 U.S. at 653 (Bren­
nan, J., dissenting). 
156. 438 U.S. at 131. 
157. Id. at 123; 450 U.S. at 656 (both cases citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960». 
158. 438 U.S. at 124. 
620 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:597 
pointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such deci­
sions might fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a lesser 
long-run risk to people like him than would any consistent prac­
tice which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision. 159 
Two phrases in the test need further definition when applied to 
the problem of inc1usionary zoning: "Such decisions" and "people 
like him." The decision involved here to compel a developer to set 
aside a certain number of units for low and moderate income per­
sons can be accurately characterized as one placing on the provider 
the burden of making certain goods or services more affordable to 
those who do not have the means to purchase such goods at market 
rates. It follows that the definition of "people like him" refers to 
others who produce goods or render services. Thus, if the govern­
ment could require a developer to bear the economic burden of pro­
viding low cost housing to those who do not have the means to buy 
his product at the market rate, it follows that the government, for 
example, could require physicians to provide low cost medical care 
and supermarkets to provide low cost food to those who need it. In­
deed, it would require any producer of goods or services to furnish 
them at below-market rates to those in need. Unless society is pre­
pared to generalize the denial of compensation to the developer in 
the case of inc1usionary zoning to all other providers of goods and 
services, the decision not to compensate the developer is patently 
unfair. 
At least two objections may be raised to this argument. First, if 
the developer is awarded a sufficient density bonus in return for 
complying with inc1usionary requirements, he suffers no economic 
harm. Thus, there would be no compensable taking. At least two 
economic analyses of the problem, however, indicate that both in 
theory and in practice the density bonus will not offset the economic 
harm an inclusionary ordinance causes. 160 The analyses further in­
dicate that the burden ultimately must be borne by the owner of un­
developed land, either the developer who purchases such land, or the 
consumer of market-rate units in the development. 161 
Second, it may be argued that, as in the case of subdivision ex­
actions, the developer obtains development permission from the lo­
cal government in return for providing low cost unitS.162 The 
159. Michelman, supra note 109, at 1223. 
160. See Ellickson, supra note 132, at 1188; Kleven, supra note 84, at 1476-79. 
161. Ellickson, supra note 132, at 1187-92; Kleven, supra note 84, at 1474-83. 
162. See text accompanying notes 125-133 supra. 
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subdivision exaction and inclusionary zoning situations, however, 
are not analogous. The justification for subdivision exactions rests in 
part on the fact that the increased population brought into the com­
munity by the new subdivision has created the need for additional 
roads, utilities, schools, or parks. Requiring the developer to con­
tribute to the cost of those amenities therefore does not constitute a 
_taking. But the nexus between a developer's activities and the need 
for low cost housing is much less clear than that between the con­
struction of a new subdivision and the need for facilities to support 
it. 
Further, if the analogy is applied to "people like him," it would 
seem that a license to practice medicine could be conditioned on the 
holder providing a certain amount of low cost medical care and that 
the issuance of whatever licenses are necessary to operate a super­
market could be conditioned on providing a certain amount of low 
cost food. Of course, society already provides for those who cannot 
afford medical care with Medicare and Medicaid, and for those who 
cannot afford food with the food stamp program. The problem is 
that the budget proposed by the Reagan Administration has made 
large reductions in those benefits.163 In particular, severe cuts in the 
section 8 program for the construction of low and moderate income 
housing have been proposed. 164 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If society wishes to keep its promise of a decent home for all, 
society as a whole should bear the cost of doing so. It is manifestly 
unfair to place the burden on those in the housing industry. Al­
though courts can prohibit exclusionary zoning practices and ensure 
that land is available for low cost housing, they are ill-equipped to 
mandate or monitor ongoing inclusionary programs. The legisla­
ture, by enacting inclusionary zoning ordinances or otherwise, is bet­
ter suited to performing that function, so long as the cost of such 
programs is shared by all. Because federal funds for housing are 
diminishing, it is convenient and tempting to look to the housing 
industry to take up the slack, but it is a flagrant violation of the tak­
ing clause of the fifth amendment. 
163. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, at I, col. 6. 
164. Id. at 43, col. I. 
